China is currently the world's largest single source of fossil fuel related CO2 emissions. In response to pressure from the international community, and in recognition of its role in global climate change mitigation, the Chinese government has announced a series of climate policy commitments, in both the Copenhagen Accord and its domestic 12 th 5 Year Plan, to gradually reduce emissions intensity by 2020. Emissions intensity reduction commitments differ significantly from emission level reduction commitments that are commonly adopted by developed economies. In this paper, we investigate the economic implications of China's recent commitments to reduce emissions intensity, and highlight the complexities involved in modelling intensity targets under uncertainty. Using G-Cubed, an intertemporal, computable general equilibrium model of the world economy, we show that China's emissions intensity targets could be achieved with a range of low and high growth emissions level trajectories corresponding to low and high growth GDP scenarios, which lead to different welfare consequences. 
Introduction
China is currently the world's largest single source of fossil fuel related CO 2 emissions. In 2010, energy related CO 2 emissions from China, accounted for a quarter of the world total.
Over the decade to 2010, growth in CO 2 emissions from China averaged just over 10 percent, which was in line with China's average annual growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). As the international community continues to debate the design of a comprehensive policy to reduce global CO 2 emissions, considerable pressure has been applied to the Chinese government to contribute, and, in response, China has made a series of commitments outlining its response to the issue of climate change. and a renewable energy target (an increase in the contribution of non fossil fuel sources to energy consumption of 11.4 percent by 2015). Importantly, the plan refers to the establishment of market mechanisms to help encourage energy efficiency.
The domestic commitments outlined above are important measures that demonstrate China's awareness of its role in the international effort to reduce CO 2 emissions. However, China's commitment to emissions intensity targets, in contrast to the emissions level targets traditionally adopted by developed economies, raises a number of questions that complicate the debate over international emissions policy. In particular, because China's commitment to emissions intensity targets could be achieved with a range of low and high growth emissions Given China's economic position and energy structure, these questions are important in determining the future path of global emissions and the effectiveness of China's response to climate change. With the subsequent decision by India to also announce an intensity target at
Copenhagen and the possibility that other developing countries will follow the approach, these questions are also important more generally for the future analysis of climate and emissions policy commitments.
Whilst emissions intensity targets may initially appear to offer additional policy flexibility compared with emissions level targets, the adoption of emissions intensity targets affects the relationship between emissions and output growth and the impact of output shocks.
Theoretical studies (see, for example, Ellerman and Sue Wing, 2003; Sue Wing et al., 2006; Quirion, 2005; and Marschinski and Edenhofer, 2010) have shown that intensity targets do not necessarily perform better than level targets under uncertainty, particularly uncertainty in GDP. Ellerman and Sue Wing (2003) argue that a major difference between the two targeting schemes is that uncertainties in GDP will be translated into uncertainties in emissions level under intensity targets; whilst under levels targets they will be translated into uncertainties in emissions intensity. Previous studies that have considered the stringency and consistency of China's emissions intensity targets (questions (i) and (ii) above) have provided mixed conclusions (see, for example, Carraro and Massetti, 2011; Tavoni, 2010; Zhang, 2010 Zhang, , 2011a Zhang, , 2011b . This result suggests that the modelling framework and underlying modelling assumptions are influential in the subsequent policy conclusions.
In this paper, the questions listed above are considered within a framework based on the advanced general equilibrium modelling techniques and optimization methods built into G-Cubed, an intertemporal, computable general equilibrium model of the world economy.
The approach addresses the implications of intensity targeting for policy analysis and modelling technique (questions (iii) and (iv) above) and explicitly deals with the implications of uncertainty.
The following section, Section 2, contains an analysis of China's emissions intensity targets with reference to the empirical behaviour of emissions intensity in China. Section 3 contains a description and discussion of the modelling assumptions and policy simulation methods used in the study. In Section 4 the generation of a baseline projection for the study is discussed. The policy analysis is presented in Section 5 and Section 6 contains a sensitivity analysis. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Background Discussion
Under the Copenhagen Accord, developed economies continued to specify their emissions reduction targets in terms of the level of emissions. The inclusion of emissions intensity targets by China and India generated debate over the comparability of effort and the extent to which intensity targets would limit the level of emissions. In terms of the comparability of Although China experienced significant improvements in emissions intensity prior to 2000, the last decade has seen the trend flatten out (Figure 1 ). Historical trends in emissions intensity have followed energy intensity trends, with little change in energy structure.
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Reductions over the second half of the last decade (2005 to 2010) were associated with administrative policies, including energy targets for provinces and companies, that resulted in the closure of small inefficient industrial plants (Zhang, 2011a) . The inclusion of an energy intensity target in the 12-5YP indicates that China expects to meet the 2015 emissions intensity reduction target with reductions in the energy intensity of GDP. Emissions intensity can be defined and decomposed as:
EMIS/GDP = EMIS/ENER*ENER/GDP
where EMIS/ENER is the emissions intensity of energy and ENER/GDP is energy intensity measured by GDP then it can be seen that the emissions intensity of energy (EMIS/ENER) needs to fall by around 1 percent if the emissions intensity (EMIS/GDP) and energy intensity (ENER/GDP) targets (-17 percent and -16 percent respectively) are to be jointly achieved. An alternative way of interpreting the targets would be that if China jointly achieves its energy intensity and renewable energy targets, it will more than meet its emissions intensity target. Whilst historically the emissions intensity of GDP and the energy intensity of GDP have moved together, it is questionable whether this will or can continue to be the case in the longer term. The inclusion of 'market mechanisms' in the 12-5YP plan suggests that China understands the role prices and reductions in the emissions intensity of energy (the ratio of emissions to energy) must play over the longer term. The renewable energy target included in the 12-5YP will help to weaken the link between energy consumption and emissions and increase the flexibility with which China can meet its 2020 Copenhagen commitment.
The 12-5YP of China specifies a reduction in the emissions intensity of GDP of 17 percent by emissions intensity of GDP of 40-45 percent by 2020, relative to 2005. As Table 1 shows, reductions are slightly weighted towards the second half of the decade. The impact of achieving the emissions intensity reduction targets on the level of emissions in 2015 and 2020 is difficult to assess and critically depends upon the evolution of GDP over the period, which, in turn, is likely to be affected by the global and domestic economic conditions through time as well as policies aimed at achieving the target. There is a range of possible GDP and emissions level combinations consistent with the emissions intensity reduction targets. Furthermore, the perceived effect of any particular policy initiative is complicated by uncertainties about future economic conditions.
Modelling Approach
The analysis undertaken in this paper is based on the advanced general equilibrium modelling techniques and optimization methods built into G-Cubed, an intertemporal, computable general equilibrium model of the world economy. Compared to recursive dynamic models, G-Cubed has the advantage of capturing agents' intertemporal choices with rational expectations combined with rule-of-thumb decision rules and short-term rigidities. Therefore it is more suitable for modeling short term economic dynamics. A detailed description of the G-Cubed model can be found in Wilcoxen (1999, 2012) . The model version used in this paper, Version 108E, disaggregates the world into 9 regions and each region's economy into 12 sectors where 6 are energy sectors.5 In addition, there are two capital goods producing sectors: one for industry and one for households. The regional and sector aggregations are provided in Table 2 and Table 3 respectively.
Techniques for modelling the impact of emissions level targets are well developed and the properties of the tools available to meet such targets (taxes and permits) are generally well understood. Modelling the impact of emissions intensity targets, however, is complicated and assumptions regarding the form of policy intervention and the evolution of the associated policy tools are critical in determining a unique emissions and GDP combination consistent with the emissions intensity target. In this paper, three assumptions are critical in determining the policy scenario projections.
Firstly, active policy is assumed to take the form of carbon tax, equivalent to the carbon price that emerges from a domestic permit trading system where carbon permits are auctioned and capped at the corresponding cumulative emissions over the target period. This assumption allows the impact of policy to be quantified and aids the comparison of policy alternatives. In practice, China's emissions strategy is likely to combine a range of policy responses. Political announcements to date suggest that China's policy response will include a nation-wide carbon trading scheme, with possible integration into a world-wide emission trading system. 6 Chinese government has approved in 2011 a pilot greenhouse gas emission rights trading scheme in seven provincial regions in an effort to encourage carbon emission reductions, including Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Shenzhen, Hubei and Guangdong. While details such as how the scheme will work and how long it will last are not available, the pilot program is an important means for realizing China's emission reduction It is, however, unclear how China will translate its emissions intensity targets into a permit allocation.
The second critical assumption concerns the evolution of the tax rate. In the literature on emissions level targeting, the evolution of the tax rate is generally assumed to follow a per annum growth rate that corresponds to the real rate of interest for the economy (see, for example, Bosetti et al., 2009; Carraro et al., 2011; McKibbin et al. 2010 The third critical assumption relates to how carbon tax revenues are recycled in the economy.
There are many revenue-recycling alternatives including the use of revenues to finance the government budget, to compensate households, to subsidize clean technology investment, and to cut other distortionary taxes. In this paper, carbon tax revenues are treated as a lump-sum transfer to the household sector. This is the simplest way to model, and the most direct way to recycle, the revenues without additional welfare loss from a given carbon tax.
The assumption creates a secondary feedback in general equilibrium models such as the G-Cubed model.
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In this paper, we use the algorithm developed by Lu and Cai (2012) to solve for a tax profile that achieves the intensity target. Under quite general assumptions, this iterative process targets according to the statement of the government. From China Daily online: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2011-11/23/content_14145909.htm. 7 Two further model assumptions are specific to the analysis in this paper. Firstly, the Chinese monetary authority is assumed to place more weight on the exchange rate and less weight on deviations in growth from trend and deviations of inflation from the inflation target in the monetary policy reaction function. This is intended to capture the effect China's peg to the US dollar. Secondly, the fiscal closure in the model is adjusted so that total government spending (i.e. the government consumption on goods and services plus the government labor expenditure) is fixed and the government deficit is endogenous. By doing so, the change of in household consumption is equivalent to the welfare change (in the G-Cubed model, household welfare (utility) per period is defined as: W= ln(C)+ln(G), where C is the household consumption and G is the total government spending).
ensures that the intensity target is achieved with minimal economic loss, measured by the deviation in GDP from the baseline. In other words, the algorithm chooses the frontier that has lowest GDP loss relative to the baseline among many plausible paths. It also ensures that the carbon tax is positive. The algorithm is well suited to this analysis given China's position on the need for consistency between any domestic emissions policy and its future economic growth goals. Alternative GDP and emissions combinations based on alternative measures of efficiency or optimality and derived by alternative techniques are possible but it is not clear at this stage how to model such policy alternatives or how they would be implemented in practice.
Baseline Scenario
Baseline 'scenarios' are generally constructed to provide a 'base' from which to analyse alternative policy and shock scenarios. Projections of key variables generated from baseline assumptions are not necessarily designed to represent a forecast of the future. In general, baselines are often constructed conservatively under 'no policy' or 'no shock' assumptions so that the impact of alternative policies and shocks can be effectively analysed.
Whilst some baseline assumptions may be (subjectively) regarded as more likely than others, Source: Baseline projection from G-Cubed (version 108E).
Policy Analysis
In this section, the impact of imposing China's 2015 and 2020 emissions intensity targets is analysed using the G-Cubed model. Two key policy scenarios are considered. The first scenario, denoted CH20, achieves China's Copenhagen commitment of a 40 percent reduction in the emissions intensity of GDP in 2020 compared with 2005 through a carbon tax that starts from 2013. The rate of tax and the evolution of emissions and GDP levels are determined by the iterative process described in the previous section. The second scenario, denoted CH1520, requires that China achieve both the Copenhagen commitment target for 2020 and the 12-5YP target of a 17 percent reduction in emissions intensity by 2015 relative to 2010. Under both scenarios, the mitigation actions of economies other than China are assumed to achieve the respective 2020 emission targets specified in the Copenhagen Accord via a similar carbon tax instrument.
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The tax rate profiles generated by the two policy scenarios, CH20 and CH1520, with reference to the baseline scenario, are shown in (Table 4) .
The second scenario, CH1520, is generated by assuming two commitment periods: one from With a lower tax rate over the first target period (2013) (2014) (2015) , the projected level of cumulative emissions over 2013 to 2020 is lower under CH1520 compared with CH20 and the projected difference in the cumulative present value of real GDP compared with the baseline scenario is smaller (Table 4) . This result highlights an interesting feature of emissions intensity targeting, particularly with respect to economic modelling. Emissions intensity targets can be achieved with a range of emissions and GDP levels and there is additional complexity involved with comparing alternative policy scenarios and determining optimality and efficiency with respect to the path of key policy variables. Source: Calculated by the authors based on the policy simulations in G-Cubed (version 108E).
The policy scenario CH1520 appears to achieve the 2020 Copenhagen intensity target at lower cost, at least with respect to the cumulative present value of real GDP, than the CH20 scenario, but the cumulative emissions reduction, and therefore the environmental benefit, is lower. To demonstrate this point, an additional policy scenario, CH1520_Q, is generated. In this scenario, the government commits to the tax rate profile generated by CH1520 until 2015, at which point the government switches to a cumulative level targeting scheme that ensures the reduction in cumulative emissions over 2013 to 2020 matches the reduction projected by the CH20 scenario. The CH1520_Q scenario therefore involves two policy restrictions: the tax rate profile generated by CH1520 to 2015 and a cumulative emissions target for the period 2013 to 2020. There is no emissions intensity target for 2020 and the tax rate is assumed to increase according to the long run real rate of interest but is allowed to jump between 2015 and 2016. The scenario is designed to demonstrate the trade-off between economic cost and environmental benefit as well as the complexity involved in modelling emissions and GDP levels under an emissions intensity targeting policy scenario.
The tax rate profile under CH1520_Q is shown in Figure 4 along with the tax rate profiles for CH20 and CH1520. As required, the tax rate under CH1520_Q follows the CH1520 tax rate profile from 2013 to 2015 after which it jumps in order to meet the 2020 cumulative target.
The jump required to meet the 2020 cumulative target is higher than that projected under both the CH1520 and CH20 scenarios demonstrating the relationship between the tax rate and the level of abatement. Source: Policy simulations from G-Cubed (version 108E).
In comparison to the CH20 scenario, the CH1520_Q scenario involves a lower tax rate and therefore a smaller reduction in cumulative emissions compared with the baseline scenario over the period 2013 to 2015. In order for cumulative emissions from both scenarios to be equal over the period 2013 to 2020, the cumulative emissions reduction relative to the baseline under CH1520_Q must exceed the corresponding reduction under CH20 over the period 2016 to 2020, and this requires a relatively higher tax rate path over this period. Given the level of emissions is more sensitive to the tax rate than GDP, the higher tax rate path results in a lower emissions intensity projection for 2020 (8.75 percent below the target).
Interestingly, the projected emissions intensity in 2015 is lower than the target achieved under CH1520, although only slightly (0.85 percent below the target), despite the same tax rate applying. In comparison to the CH1520 scenario, agents in the CH1520_Q scenario expect the relatively higher tax rate path beyond 2015 and choose to mitigate slightly more in the earlier period when it is relatively less expensive. Furthermore, given agents in the model expect both the timing and the future path of the carbon tax in the initial year (2011), they act to increase CO 2 emissions under all policy scenarios prior to the introduction of the policy in order to reduce mitigation costs over the whole projection period ( Figure 5 ). 13 The level of GDP also increases relative to the baseline prior to the introduction of the tax in all of the policy scenarios. Source: Policy simulations from G-Cubed (version 108E).
Under the CH20 scenario, GDP is lower than in the baseline, and remains lower, once the policy is introduced (Figure 6 ). Under the CH1520 scenario, the level of GDP remains higher than the baseline projection until the 2015 target year. The CH1520_Q scenario, with a higher tax rate over the second target period is characterised by lower emissions and GDP, relative to the CH1520 scenario.
Employment effects are also distributed differently under the alternative scenarios. Under the CH20 scenario the greatest deviations from the baseline occur during the first target period (2013) (2014) (2015) whereas under the CH1520 and CH1520_Q scenarios the greatest deviations occur during the second target period (Table 5 ). Source: Policy simulations from G-Cubed (version 108E).
A comparison of the cumulative present value of real GDP projections under the CH20 and CH1520_Q scenarios (both of which achieve the same cumulative reduction in emissions over 2013 to 2020) demonstrates the efficiency of a tax rate path that adheres to the long run real interest rate or 'Hotelling' rule. The CH1520_Q does not adhere strictly to the rule over Under the CH20 scenario, the introduction of a carbon tax acts as a shock to the economy that slows the growth rate of real GDP in the initial years (2013) (2014) (2015) . The annual growth rate recovers in the following years. Under the CH1520 scenario, the current real GDP growth rate is maintained over 2010-2015 as a consequence of the relatively low carbon tax rate, but the economy experiences a relatively stronger slow down in the following 5-year period because of the substantial carbon tax rate jump. Under the CH1520_Q scenario the slowdown is even stronger over the second 2016-2020 period. However, the CH20 scenario and the CH1520 scenario generate comparable average annual growth rates over the entire period of 2010-2020, suggesting that, in terms of GDP growth, alternative policy paths represent a trade-off between the short term (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) and the medium term (2015-2020), which is likely to be influenced by political considerations. The effect of the carbon tax on consumption in China is positive in the short and medium term (Table 5 ).
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Due to China's relatively high level of emissions and the relatively small share of consumption in GDP, carbon tax revenue in China is projected to be relatively high, compared with other economies. Carbon tax revenue is assumed to be transferred to households as a lump sum and, as a result, households' cash flows of net income and wealth as a proportion of GDP increase substantially in response to the carbon tax and this positive effect dominates the negative effect from decreasing labour demand and increasing goods prices. This consumption gain, however, is coupled with depressed investment levels that, in the long run, feeds back and reduces consumption.
Sensitivity Analysis

Alternative Baselines
In order to gain some understanding of the influence of the baseline projection and its characteristics on the policy analysis, the two original policy scenarios (CH20 and CH1520) are applied to a set of 9 alternative baselines driven by alternative assumptions regarding China's domestic economic policy, the evolution of China's energy efficiency and the impact of global economic uncertainties. This allows: (i) the robustness of the qualitative results with respect to different baseline assumptions to be evaluated; and (ii) the relationship between policy impacts and uncertainty to be analysed. In particular, the alternative baseline scenarios feature different assumptions regarding total factor productivity (TFP) shocks (SHY), labour productivity shocks (SHL) and "autonomous energy efficiency improvement" (AEEI) shocks (SHEF) for China as well alternative long term impacts of the global financial crisis (GFC) and the European Union (EU) crisis. A detailed specification of each baseline's assumptions is documented in Table 6 . Further details can be found in Appendix A.2. Table 7 contains the average annual growth rate projections for real GDP and CO 2 emissions generated by each of the alternative baseline scenarios for the period 2010 to 2035. Higher AEEI for China produces higher GDP growth and a lower emissions trajectory, which results in a much lower intensity path (Figure 8 ). TFP shocks and labour productivity shocks have a similar effect on GDP and emissions growth and the impact on emissions intensity is small.
Emissions intensity is not sensitive to global shocks unless the domestic economy is also directly affected by the shocks. 16 The HighSHEF scenario, where AEEI is 50 percent higher than in the original baseline, projects the lowest emissions intensity path while the contrasting LowSHEF scenario projects the highest emissions intensity path. HighSHL Assume 2% catch-up rate in labor productivity for all sectors throughout 2010-2100.
Global Shocks EUcrisis
Negative TFP shocks in EU's non-energy sectors starting from -0.5% (-1% for durable and non-durable manufacturing sectors) and dying out till 2100; Exchange rate shock on EU by 2% persistently, which hits exports.
GFC_exclCHI
Negative TFP shocks in non-energy sectors starting from -0.5% (-1% for durable and non-durable manufacturing sectors) and dying out till 2100 for all regions in the model except China.
GFC_inclCHI
Negative TFP shocks in non-energy sectors starting from -0.5% (-1% for durable and non-durable manufacturing sectors) and dying out till 2100 for all regions in the model including China. Table 8 contains the generated tax rates in key years for the two policy scenarios under each of the alternative baseline scenarios. As expected, the greatest change in the projected tax rate occurs when baseline assumptions regarding energy efficiency are changed. Under the HighSHEF baseline scenario projected emissions are lower and projected real GDP is higher than in the original baseline. This results in projected emissions intensity levels that are closer to the target levels in 2015 and 2020. The lower tax rates required under the HighSHEF scenarios compared with the original scenario results in higher levels of both GDP and emissions in the target years. Conversely, using the LowSHEF baseline (which is characterized by higher emissions and lower GDP relative to the original baseline), results in policy scenarios characterized by lower GDP and emissions levels in the target years, relative to the original policy scenario.
All of the CH1520 scenarios based on the alternative baselines are characterized by a tax rate that jumps between 2015 and 2016 ( Figure 9 ). This indicates that in all cases the CH1520 scenario results in cumulative emissions over the policy period 2013 to 2020 that are lower than the cumulative emissions projected by the alternative CH20 scenarios. The largest tax rate jumps and cumulative emissions level differences occur under the LowSHEF and PosTFP alternative baseline scenarios. These baseline scenarios require relatively high tax rates over the entire policy period to meet the intensity targets, compared with the other alternative baseline scenarios. The applicability of the Hotelling rule in determining the tax rate path under emissions intensity targeting appears to be affected by alternative baseline scenarios and more research is needed in order to assess the optimality and efficiency of alternative policy instrument paths under emissions intensity targeting. *Note: Real tax rates are measured in 2010US$/metric ton of CO 2 .
Source: Policy simulations from G-Cubed (version 108E) under different baselines. 
Expectations and Unexpected Shocks
The dynamic adjustment paths discussed in Section 5 and the cumulative present value of GDP under the two alternative targeting instruments are considered relative to the CH1520 scenario. Table 9 contains the percentage deviation of these variables from the cumulative value over 2016-2020 under the CH1520 scenario for both of the alternatives and both of the TFP shocks.
CH1520_SHY_neg denotes the scenario subject to the negative shock TFP shock and intensity targeting. CH1520_SHY_pos denotes the scenario subject to the positive TFP shock and intensity targeting. CH1520_SHY_neg_level and CH1520_SHY_pos_level denote the scenarios subject to emissions level targeting and the negative and positive TFP shock respectively. Figure 10 contains the tax rates projected under each of these alternatives as well as the tax rate projection from the original CH1520 scenario. finding that given variation in GDP, if GDP growth is greater than expected, an absolute (level) target will incur a higher cost than an intensity target whilst if GDP growth is lower than expected the intensity target will generate higher costs.
Conclusions
In this paper, the emissions intensity targets announced by China as part of the Copenhagen international agreement and as part of China's domestic 12 th 5 Year Plan have been analysed and compared. The analysis led to a general discussion of the complex issues involved in modelling intensity targets. These issues require further research.
Meeting China's intensity targets will require active policy intervention compared with the baseline scenario generated here. The targets could be met without substantial growth effects -the two policy scenarios generated in this paper achieve cumulative emissions reductions of around 20 and 25 percent over the period 2013 to 2020 relative to the baseline, with an average annual real GDP growth rate that is 0.2 percentage points below the baseline growth rate over the same period.
Determining consistency between the 2015 and 2020 emissions intensity targets is affected by assumptions that determine the policy path. Under the methodology assumed in this paper, meeting both the 2015 and 2020 targets results in a policy path characterised by less emissions reductions and lower cumulative GDP losses than the policy path generated by meeting the 2020 target only. The analysis is accompanied by discussion of the additional complexity involved in determining an appropriate path under emissions intensity targeting compared with emissions level targeting and there is still research that needs to be undertaken in this area.
Emissions intensity targeting allows flexibility in determining a corresponding emissions level in the target years but it then restricts the corresponding level of GDP. In high growth periods, the policy restriction is eased but in low growth periods an intensity target places a further emissions growth restriction on the economy. The uncertainty analysis undertaken here supports the theoretical findings in the literature: if GDP growth is higher than expected, an emissions level target will impose higher economic costs than an intensity target, whilst if GDP growth is lower than expected, the intensity target will incur higher costs.
How to appropriately model intensity targets, particularly when future uncertainties are important, is still an unresolved issue. The techniques used in this paper are advanced and complex and are at the forefront of economic modelling in this area. Nevertheless, it is not clear that a Hotelling type rule is an appropriate assumption under intensity targeting. Since policy agents are free to choose a corresponding emissions and GDP combination, and to adjust that combination over time, further research is needed to determine optimality and efficiency under alternative policy objectives. We can observe that the GDP projection from EIA is higher than the original baseline projection from the G-Cubed while emissions projection from EIA is lower. This leads the emissions intensity projection from EIA is much lower than that from the G-Cubed. Under the EIA projection, China does not need to take further mitigation action to achieve its targets both in 2015 and 2020. However, the fluctuated emissions intensity trend in the last decade indicates harder and harder reduction in intensity and even rising trend in the future if active climate policy is not placed. While the G-Cubed projection reflects this trend in the baseline without policy, the EIA projection seems to expect a substantial reduction in emissions intensity in China, which may take certain climate policy into account in the baseline assumptions. In the short run, when there are negative shocks in SHEF or SHY, although the output decreases, the price level is pushed up and dominates the output effect such that the short-run profits of firms increase. This therefore increases the contemporaneous income of households and therefore the consumption in the short run; however this cannot sustain in the long run as the negative shocks persist in which the output drop will over-take the gain from rising prices and the present value of wealth also decreases due to a permanent negative shock on the wage.
The negative shocks from TFP and AEEI also cause depreciation of RMB and then the spike of interest rate due to Chinese monetary authority's reaction to stabilize the value of currency.
This results in decrease in investment. The trade surplus rises in the short run because of the depreciation of RMB but it diminishes in the long term due to a negative shock on exports resulting from declining output.
The main difference between the SHEF shock and SHY shock is in the energy consumption.
With a negative SHEF shock, energy consumption increases due to a lower efficiency of energy use in the production, and thus, requires more energy input to get the same output.
However, a negative TFP shock will have a negative effect on the total output, therefore, decreases energy input as a result.
The labor productivity shocks (SHL) have different implications for the Chinese economy. If labor productivity catches up the frontier economy (United States) more slowly, labor productivity is increasing by a smaller amount initially which causes decreases in labor demand, energy input and investment in the following decade. However, the initial slow growth increases the gap of labor productivity between China and United States (the frontier economy); therefore, a much higher growth of labor productivity is expected in the longer term. Thus, labor demand, GDP, consumption and investment are higher than the original baseline in the later periods. Second, the global shocks (see Figure A5 ), such as Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and EU crisis, all have negative long-term impacts on Chinese economy, but have different economic implications. The impact from EU crisis is more moderate. Interestingly, the EU crisis even has a mild stimulus effect on China's consumption, investment and energy consumption for the first 10 years. This is mainly because a capital inflow from Europe, which stimulates the investment, GDP and consumption in the short run. It also leads to the appreciation of RMB relative to Euro in the short term. As a result, the trade surplus diminishes in the short term accordingly, and monetary policy responds by decreasing the short-run interest rate. But the persistently weak European demand for Chinese goods will shock China's exports and therefore production in the long run.
On the contrary, the prevailing global crisis has the opposite impacts on China's economy in the short run, and much more significant when China itself is also involved in the crisis (GFC_inclCHI). The economic implications of GFC shocks for China are similar to the domestic shocks addressed above. But the amount of impacts is much larger than domestic shocks as GFC also shocks the external demand for Chinese goods. And the value of RMB is critically dependent on the economic evolutions of other regions in the crisis, which is also determined by the size of shocks that we assume in the corresponding scenarios.
